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Usable Security
INTRODUCTION
Recent decades have been characterized by the 
growth of information technologies in the private 
and public sectors. The positive impact that ICT 
has on job performance, as well as the expan-
sion and creation of business opportunities for 
companies, count as the main drivers for this 
growth. This growth led to the proliferation of 
distributed applications and physical devices, 
and the diffusion of technologies that facilitate 
social participation and social interaction. All 
these applications, devices and interactions may 
contain important information, or give access to 
sensitive data, putting them at risk.
The rapid diffusion of technology has led to 
the reduction of active security monitoring, as 
well as the lack of technically competent people in 
control of applications and devices. Moreover, the 
increment in social interaction increases the dam-
age other people can directly or indirectly cause. 
Traditionally, security is only considered 
as strong as its weakest link, and people were 
considered as the weak links (Schneier, 2003). 
This thinking triggers a vicious circle. (Adam 
& Sasse, 1999) stated that users are informed as 
little as possible on security mechanisms took 
by IT departments, precisely because they are 
seen as inherently untrustworthy. Their work has 
shown that users were not sufficiently aware of 
security issues and tend to build their own (often 
inaccurate) models of possible security threats. 
Users have a low perception of threats because 
they lack the necessary information to understand 
their importance. According to (Sasse & al., 2001) 
blaming users for a security breach is like blam-
ing human error rather than bad design. Security 
has, therefore, a human dimension that must be 
neither ignored nor neglected. The increase in the 
number of breaches may be attributed to design-
ers who fail to sufficiently consider the human 
factor in their design techniques. Thus, to undo 
the Gordian knot of security, we must provide a 
human dimension to security.
BACKGROUND
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) is a field 
concerned with the interaction between people 
and technology, and how this supports humans 
in completing tasks to achieve one of more spe-
cific goals. Traditionally, it has been involved in 
analyzing and improving usability.
HCI has been an active area of research since 
the 1980s. It has focused on improving the design 
of user interfaces, and helping users transforming 
their goals into productive actions for the com-
puters. Improving user interfaces and usability 
is important because poorly designed interfaces 
increase the potential for human error. In particular, 
human behavior is largely goal-driven, therefore 
the execution of activities which help the users 
to achieve their goals is the main key to create a 
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usable system. So, when a user “engages with a 
complex system of rules that change as the prob-
lem changes” (e.g. an interface does not present 
information clearly and coherently with a user 
mental model), it leads to “Cognitive Friction” 
(Cooper, 2004).
The “Cognitive Friction” is a by-product of the 
information age, and it is more evident in all the 
computing devices lacking a natural cause-effect 
relation between user input and device output, e.g. 
when similar inputs result in different outputs. 
When a person is dealing with the cognitive 
friction, ancestral mechanisms of the human being 
come into play. As result, in this case, users can-
not be modeled as purely rational beings. Thus, to 
understand users’ behavior, and to appreciate how 
systems can be made usable, we need to consider 
the following factors:
• Users are driven by goals. People are natu-
rally prone to pursuing goals. In achiev-
ing this, according to Krug “every ques-
tion mark adds to our cognitive workload, 
distracting our attention from the task at 
hand” (Krug, 2005). This, according to 
Norman (Norman, 2002), creates usability 
issues, because it introduces the cognitive 
friction into play and leads users to make 
mistakes, which sometimes can also result 
into security flaws;
• Users do not read the instructions. Users 
proceed by trial and are not interested in 
reading manuals, instructions or documen-
tation. For most of the users, it is not im-
portant to know how to do something, until 
the moment in which it is not necessary to 
use it (Krug, 2005);
• Users follow the path of least resistance. 
Several studies in the field of HCI have 
shown how users, in their task to accom-
plish a goal, tend to seek the path requir-
ing them less effort (e.g. (Norman, 2002)). 
Once they find the first reasonable option 
allowing them to perform the desired ac-
tion, it becomes irrelevant to them if it 
is not the most efficient and safe option. 
Furthermore, users have no incentive to 
improve. When users “find something that 
works - no matter how badly – they tend 
not to look for a better way” (Krug, 2005). 
Some operations can be inconvenient from 
the point of view of performance, others, 
in the long run, can cause damage to the 
system: users may be unaware of it until 
problems show up for the first time.
While many research studies in HCI has been 
focused in defining what usability is and, conse-
quently, intervene in improving user interfaces, 
several studies have shown that the “ease of use” 
cannot be limited to those aspects alone (Whitten 
& Tygar, 1999) (Balfanz & al., 2004).
To increase the acceptance of the security 
mechanisms, conventional wisdom suggests it 
is sufficient to make them easier through a more 
usable user interface. In practice, however, it is 
not enough to provide a proper user interface, 
even in the case it is supported by specific con-
figuration guidelines. This is what Whitten and 
Tygar argue, in their study “Why Johnny cannot 
encrypt” (Whitten & Tygar, 1999), which is a 
seminar paper in the usable security literature. 
This study focuses on analyzing data and email 
encryption of the security software Pretty Good 
Privacy 5.0 (PGP). They showed that user errors 
have not decreased, despite years of improve-
ments to the graphical interface. This has led to 
additional studies looking beyond the interfaces.
This field of study, which deals with analyzing 
the usability issues related to security, is called 
HCI-Sec and was founded in 2000 by Whitten as 
a mailing list on Yahoo! Groups. It has been said 
that HCI-Sec “only rarely received significant 
attention as a primary subject for study” (Balfanz 
& al., 2004), this despite the fact that “usability 
remains one of the most pressing and challeng-
ing problems for computer security” (Whitten & 
Tygar, 1999).
Although HCI-Sec has only recently gained 
momentum, initial studies have their roots in 1975, 
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when (Saltzer & Schroeder, 1975) argued that the 
usability was an essential component of a secure 
system. In their seminar “The protection of Infor-
mation in Computer System” they presented eight 
basic principles that serve as guidelines for the 
design of systems aimed at protecting information. 
The principle of the “Psychological Acceptability” 
is one of them, and states: “it is essential that the 
human interface is designed for ease of use so 
that users routinely and automatically apply the 
protection mechanisms correctly”.
Since then, little work has been focused on 
HCI-Sec and, as a result, the security systems 
are sometimes poorly designed, leading to cases 
where users seek alternative interactions with the 
system or completely avoid the security mecha-
nisms. Given the difficulty in making IT systems 
usable, it is unsurprising that the problem of 
“aligning usability and security” has been almost 
neglected until the beginning of the early 90s of 
the last century.
According to Fléchais, it is wrong to justify 
such a dearth of research as a tension between 
usability and security. Until that decade, the re-
search community was more focused on technical 
trade-offs, such as for example the realization of 
robust encryption on low energy consumption 
microprocessors (Flechais & Sasse, 2005). This 
is reasonable, because, before the growth of the 
Internet, security was mainly a physical concern, 
and physical thinking was based on a military 
mindset. 
The problem of usability in security, how-
ever, was not limited to this, and already existed 
during the 80s and 90s. For example, it was al-
ready possible to improve usability and possibly 
weaken security by automating common tasks. 
Brad Reid (Reid, 1987), argued that programmer 
convenience is the antithesis of security because 
it becomes intruder convenience if the program-
mer’s account is compromised. Reid mentioned a 
“programmer” because at that time the main users 
of the computer systems were mostly researchers 
or computer science specialists who possessed 
some programming aptitude. These individuals 
possessed technical skills, received specific train-
ing and were, therefore, prone to ignore usability, 
and failing to identify the security implications 
this might have.
In the 1990s, with the diffusion of personal 
computers and the mass adoption of the Inter-
net, the problem of usable security has remained 
virtually unexplored and did not leverage pre-
existing HCI research. The initial solution to the 
problem addressed the symptoms rather than the 
root cause, by updating the anti-virus software, 
or the patching software in known problems. 
Therefore, research has been focused more on 
short-term practical gains, rather than long-term 
design changes that attend to both usability and 
security. A further problem is that few developers 
are trained in usability, or have significant software 
security experience.
The advent of HCI-Sec introduced the idea 
of security as an important consideration for us-
ability, while usability is an important aspect of 
security (Cranor & Garfinkel, 2005). Therefore, if 
the purpose of HCI was to ensure that users would 
reach their goals by the use of better interfaces, 
HCI-Sec aims to ensure that users are able to 
achieve these goals also in the most secure way.
MAIN FOCUS OF THE CHAPTER
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the goals and 
state of the art of usability and security to determine 
where and how they can be effectively “aligned”.
ISSUES, CONTROVERSIES, 
PROBLEMS
Usability has become a key factor in the quality of 
the software and has a determining role in produc-
tivity and acceptance (Cranor & Garfinkel, 2005). 
This term has more than one meaning, though; it 
refers multiple concepts that may or may not be 
taken together. Some are based on execution time, 
performance, user satisfaction and ease of learn-
 I
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ing (also known as learnability). Thus, it remains 
something that is not unequivocally defined, and 
is subject to interpretation based on the stake one 
has in usability (Hertzum, 2010).
Over the years, the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) itself produced various, 
and sometimes conflicting, definitions of usability 
(Figure 1). These definitions can be classified 
into two main categories: product-oriented and 
process-oriented. The former category provides 
definitions of the qualities that belong to the 
final product. This appears to be a reasonable 
approach, because software usability is essential 
for end-users, as crucial for achieving particular 
tasks quickly and effectively. The latter category 
focuses on the methodological aspects of obtaining 
usability: for a software developer, usability de-
scribes the internal attributes of a system, including 
concerns such as quality of design, documentation, 
and maintenance.
These various points of view and the different 
requirements have resulted in contrasting perspec-
tives on usability, carried out by several groups 
of experts in a non-uniform and inconsistent way. 
For example, some terms have different meanings 
and labels. In document ISO/IEC 9241-11 (ISO, 
1998) learnability, as a quality of a software, is 
designed as the “time of learning”, while in ISO/
IEC 9126 (ISO, 2012) is defined as “compre-
hensible input and output, instruction readiness, 
messages readiness”.
Discrepancies among the standard can be even 
more significant: in the standard ISO/IEC 9126, 
usability is defined in a product-oriented way as 
a set of attributes that bear on the effort needed 
for use and on the individual assessment of such 
use, by a stated or implied set of users. The quali-
tative properties to be achieved are Understand-
ability, Learnability, Operability, Attractiveness 
and Usability compliance (Abran & al, 2003). 
The standard that replaced it, ISO/IEC 25010, 
focuses on the user’s goals and on how fast they 
are achieved, in addition to user satisfaction with 
the system. In this document, usability replaces 
learnability property in favour of operability (Lew 
& Olsina, 2010), which is described as the degree 
Figure 1. Usability definitions according to ISO/IEC 9241-11, ISO/IEC 9126 and ISO/IEC 25010
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to which the product has attributes that enable it 
to be understood, to be learned, to be used, and to 
be attractive to the user, when used under specific 
conditions.
With this definition of operability, the proper-
ties to be achieved are appropriateness, recogni-
sability, ease of use, learnability, attractiveness, 
technical accessibility and compliance. The same 
standard describes however also a different model, 
Quality in Use, in which the usability appears 
described as the extent to which a product can 
be used by specific users to achieve specified 
goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfac-
tion without adverse consequences in a specified 
context of use.
The process-oriented point of view was defined 
in the document ISO/IEC 9241, which is a suite of 
international standards on “Ergonomics of Human 
System Interaction”. In Part 11, the definitions of 
usability from different perspectives are grouped 
together. The key components are effectiveness 
and satisfaction. The former describes the interac-
tions from the point of view of process efficiency 
and puts the focus on the results and valuable assets. 
The latter requires carefulness on the user’s needs. 
The standard attempts to explain how to identify 
the information that has to be taken into account 
when evaluating usability in terms of measures of 
user performance and user satisfaction.
The criterion of satisfaction is very difficult 
to be measured and, for this reason, additional 
usability factors have been proposed in Part 2 of 
ISO/IEC 25010. They are likeability, pleasurable, 
comfort and trust.
Given the subjectivity and the different contexts 
in which the term “usability” can be used, Kainda 
and Flechais (Kainda et al., 2010) proposed to con-
solidate it in six key factors which are defined as:
• Effectiveness: A system is only usable if 
its users can achieve intended goals, and 
effectiveness is measured by whether us-
ers are able to complete a particular task 
or not; 
• Satisfaction: A system must be accepted 
by users, otherwise it is bound to fail, even 
if is usable;
• Accuracy: A system demands may have an 
impact on the user’s tasks. For example, a 
system may require 100% accuracy in an 
providing information, such as a pin code 
or a password. However, this accuracy, is 
not always achievable by the user, making 
the system unusable;
• Efficiency: To guarantee usability, a sys-
tem must ensure that each user’s goals are 
achievable within an acceptable amount of 
time and effort;
• Memorability: A system may require 
users to memorize secrets, namely pass-
words. This may be problematic since the 
users are cognitively burdened with cre-
dentials, and other secrets;
• Knowledge: This corresponds to the 
Learnability property. However, the user 
may not attempt to learn or understand 
the system, as users tend to care only 
about the parts of the system of interest to 
them. Therefore, knowledge of the security 
mechanisms or policies is required by the 
user;
These characteristics can be measured in dif-
ferent ways. Effectiveness, satisfaction, efficiency 
and memorability can be measured directly, while 
accuracy and knowledge are measured indirectly, 
i.e. the first set of characteristics can be measured 
directly by quite simple empirical indicators, while 
the latter are typically derived by combining more 
indicators.
Another HCI-sec problem is that adequate us-
ability is essential in specific security mechanism 
(e.g. authentication process), but the requirements 
for achieving it and a high level of security may 
collide (Braz & Robert, 2006). For example, in 
the case of password-based authentication, many 
usability principles (e.g. use shortcuts in case 
of frequent use, provide informative feedback) 
 I
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contrast with best practices (e.g. password must 
not be showed during typing, and only success 
or failure must be reported, to mitigate social 
engineering and guessing).
SOLUTIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
From the perspective of HCI, there are several 
principles for building a system that is “quick to use 
and relatively error-free” (Johnson, 2007). One of 
the most important of these is ensuring the system 
“does what the user wants” without “complicating 
the user’s task”. Another important aspect is to 
evaluate the usability of a system. In this regard, 
the System Usability Scale (SUS) (Brooke, 1996) 
is a widely accepted base. The SUS is designed 
to give a quick impression of the overall usability 
of a product. It consists of ten questions (e.g. “I 
found this system unnecessarily complex”, I found 
the various functions in this system were well in-
tegrated”) rated on a Likert scale, resulting in an 
overall 0-100 value, where 100 represents excel-
lent levels of usability. SUS has been adopted in 
many contexts, also in HCI-sec (De Witt, J. Kuljis, 
2006) since quick to complete, thus avoiding user 
frustration and ensure answer accuracy.
From the perspective of methods and pro-
cedures used in HCI, many of them have been 
adapted to the HCI-Sec. The main difference is 
the focus on a balanced trade-off between usability 
and security.
The methodologies between HCI and HCI-
Sec differ for at least five key aspects that are 
analyzed in the following paragraphs, detailing 
related recommendation as well.
THE SECONDARY GOAL
People do not generally sit at their computers 
wanting to manage their security; rather they 
want to send mail, browse web pages or download 
software.
Traditionally, security definitions have been 
defined around attackers. Unfortunately, doing so 
ignores the legitimate and non-malicious use, and 
also may adversely affect the system (Kainda & 
al, 2010). Users may not have the perception of 
damaging the system or, through making certain 
actions or inactions, bypassing security systems, 
putting their assets risk. Users must be constantly 
made aware of the operations involving security 
and the system must ensure that it is hard to make 
catastrophic errors. Furthermore, if such events 
occur, user actions should be reversible. To il-
lustrate how this can be achieved, consider the 
implementation of dialog boxes requiring confir-
mation of a particular action. The implementation 
of the “Empty Trash” feature in desktop operating 
systems typically allows accidentally deleted files 
to be recovered, or the “Undo” button, now present 
in many desktop applications, allows for an action 
to be reverted. In a business setting, backup and 
redundancy of servers are amongst the systems 
used to avoid potential damages even from non-
malicious users. Unfortunately, as Garfinkel has 
demonstrated, even “Empty Trash” functionality 
can behave in a manner inconsistent with a cor-
responding interface design (Garfinkel, 2005).
ABSTRACTION
Security policies are usually phrased as abstract 
rules that are easily understood by programmers 
but “alien” and unintuitive to many members of 
the wider user population.
(Johnson, 2007) proposes a focus on learn-
ability and memorability, properties which, as we 
have discussed, belong to Usability. Facilitating 
the learning process is possible, by creating a 
consistent lexicon transmitted through the user 
interface. This is convenient since it was dis-
covered that a particular trend also applies to IT 
users: they prefer not to invest time in training or 
reading manuals, but in learning the functionality 
of the system through the exploration of the user 
interface (Krug, 2005).
Usable Security
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THE HIDDEN FAILURE
It is difficult to provide good feedback for se-
curity management and configuration because 
configurations are complex and not easy to 
summarize.
Making a secure system does not guarantee its 
security because the system must also be installed 
and used in a secure way. (Bishop, 2005) noted 
that the configuration is a key component of se-
curity because it is during the configuration of a 
system that it is defined who will interact with the 
system and how. Practitioners and security staff 
often make mistakes in applying default software 
configurations, ignoring the fact that different 
configurations lead to different security contexts. 
For example, a computer configured to be secure 
in a university research environment could be 
considered insecure in a military installation. In 
the former, information might be made accessible 
to the whole class or research group while, in the 
latter, they might be accessible only on a need to 
know basis.
One method used to counteract and minimize 
the adverse effects of an incorrect configura-
tion is the ”fail-safe default” principle (Saltzer 
& Schroeder, 1975). This states that the safest 
solution is a default configuration without any 
permission granted. During the configuration 
phase, a security responsible task selects the 
correct permissions for each system function 
and group of users. When configuring a fire-
wall, this principle corresponds to the whitelist 
configuration: everything that is not explicitly 
allowed is forbidden by default. This policy 
contrasts with the blacklist, which grants any 
permission by default and chooses specifically 
the ones to forbid. The former one, despite being 
more difficult to handle, forces discussion on 
any permission to be enabled, thereby making 
the system more secure.
THE BARN DOOR
Once a secret has been left accidentally unpro-
tected, even for a short time, there’s no way to be 
sure it has not already been read by an attacker.
Once sensitive data or vital assets for the 
company are compromised and made public by 
mistake, it is possible that attackers will use it for 
their own advantage. There are several ways to ap-
proach this problem. You might try to avoid social 
engineering attacks, where even expert users fall 
victim to if channels of communication they trust 
and use regularly are compromised. This risk can 
be prevented using anti-fraud mechanisms, aimed 
at preventing phishing through e-mail or other 
channels. Should an attacker successfully obtain 
sensitive information such as passwords, private 
keys or credit card numbers, it should also be pos-
sible to erase and getting new information. In the 
case of commercially sensitive intellectual property, 
DRM can also be implemented, which can control 
access to resources, and revoke permissions in the 
event of a successful attack. DRM technology is, 
however, complex to maintain and not without its 
own usability issues (Favale & al., 2016)
THE WEAKEST LINK
The security of a networked computer is like a 
chain: it is only as strong as its weakest component. 
It is generally recognized that the user is often 
the weak point of a computer system from a security 
perspective. However, as discussed, this creates a 
vicious circle in which users are kept unaware of 
what the security mechanisms are. Therefore, users 
are driven to the creation of their own security views, 
which fail to align with reality. To avoid this issue, 
security mechanisms should be complemented by 
specific guidelines that take into account the specific 
constraints of security mechanisms, minimizing 
discrepancies introduced by users with different 
backgrounds and skills.
 I
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FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Future research direction will address the problem 
of measuring usable security in a more systematic 
and practical way, or, as a first milestone toward 
the goal, understand if there are real advantages 
and tangible benefits resulting from formative and 
summative usability assessment processes. Such 
an assessment is not easy because of the previously 
discussed complex variables into play. Moreover, 
there are several aspects that are influenced by 
contextual conditions, such as economic resources, 
time, and other economic or innovation drivers. 
To address these evaluation issues, we need 
to understand what it means to precisely evaluate 
usable security. Only then will it be possible to 
identify what methods can be effectively used in 
the analysis processes.
Also, all these facets activate different levels 
of sub-choices that depend on several variables 
and the context of use. One of these could, for 
example, be advancing the project in time: do 
you want to evaluate a system in its initial stage 
of development, or at a different iteration of the 
same application? It has already been noted that, 
while considering security at an early stage of a 
software product’s design is virtuous, design tech-
niques may be needed that specifically consider 
security at a later stage (Faily, 2015).
For any improvements, development should be 
scientifically measurable. As Lord Kevin said over 
200 years ago “if you cannot measure it, you cannot 
improve it”, meaning that without a scientifically 
sound evaluation methodology, would be difficult 
to draw any objective conclusions and take any 
proper improving actions (Atzeni & Lioy, 2005).
Measurement should not be an end in itself, 
but lead to something analogous to a benchmark, 
which is a result or a group of results that can 
become a point of reference and standard; this 
enables comparison and judgment on how good 
or bad things are.
CONCLUSION
Human behavior is goal-driven, therefore each 
aspect of a system interacting with users, security 
included, should be organized to help users to 
achieve their goals. In particular, security must be 
embedded paying attention to usability aspects, 
to avoid “cognitive friction”. 
Since usable security principles can be ap-
plied both to final product and to the production 
process, from one hand it is necessary to adopt 
methodologies to understand and measure the 
usability of the final artifact, from the other, all 
production line components should be consid-
ered in light of usability effectiveness, starting 
from the earliest steps in building software. 
This ensures that the quality of usable security 
is ` built into’ the final product, and diagnose the 
feedback that allows the project to be changed 
before its final release.
The ability to diagnose and correct an error 
in the usability of a software before entering the 
market is in itself a significant benefit, as are 
methods that can also be used to determine qual-
ity variations between two iterations of a given 
software. It is, therefore, necessary to describe and 
scientifically evaluate the properties of usability 
and security as two correlated factors, even if they 
are both difficult to quantify and even define. 
To facilitate quantification and definition, past 
literature split up usability and usable security in 
more atomic pieces (e.g. effectiveness, satisfac-
tion, accuracy, efficiency, memorability) to make 
them more identifiable and comparable.
Finally, a scientifically sound usability as-
sessment is a target of great interest. Further 
research is welcome because it is a complex 
problem (even when decomposed in sub-parts 
like satisfaction or memorability) and because 
the context of a product under evaluation can 
introduce influencing variables, enlarging the 
problem complexity.
Usable Security
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Cognitive Friction: The affinity friction 
between the user and the software that origi-
nates in the user mind when a product does not 
behave the way the user expects (e.g. a button on 
the screen that does not trigger any action when 
the user press it). (https://www.linkedin.com/
pulse/20140801230851-205508682-what-the-
heck-is-cognitive-friction).
Comfort (ISO/IEC 25010): The extent to 
which the user is satisfied with physical comfort.
Effectiveness: The properties which measures 
to what extent interactions achieve objective pro-
cess efficiency indicators (i.e. concrete results of 
user actions while using the addressed product).
Likeability (ISO/IEC 25010): The extent to 
which the user perceives achievement of pragmatic 
goals, including successful subjective results of 
use and consequences of use.
Memorability: A factor which measures how 
much a product require users to memorize secrets 
(e.g. passwords or passphrases).
Operability: The degree to which the product 
has attributes that enable it to be understood, be 
learned, be used and be attractive to the user, when 
used under specific conditions.
Pleasurable (ISO/IEC 25010): The extent 
to which the user is satisfied with his perceived 
achievement of hedonistic goals of stimulation, 
identification and evocation and associated emo-
tion responses.
Psychological Acceptability: A founding 
principle of usable security stating that “it is es-
sential that the human interface is designed for 
ease of use so that users routinely and automati-
cally apply the protection mechanisms correctly”.
Process-Oriented Usability: The categoriza-
tion of usability aiming to achieve it addressing 
the characteristics of the process to obtain the final 
product (e.g. documentation and design effort).
Product-Oriented Usability: The categoriza-
tion of usability aiming to achieve it addressing 
the final products characteristics (e.g. learning 
curve to use the product).
Satisfaction: The property which measures 
to what extent the user’s needs are subjectively 
satisfied by the product.
Trust (ISO/IEC 25010): The extent to which 
the user is persuaded that the product will behave 
as intended.
